About half of the readers of this article would not be able to tell whether a picture of the Mona Lisa is correct or mirror-reversed. Neuropsychological studies may help explain this striking dissociation between the ability to identify images and memory for their handedness.
A recent advertising campaign ran a picture of eight copies of the Mona Lisa. In four of them she faced left, as in Figure 1 , and in the other four she faced to her right. All but two of them had a detail changed: for example, which hand crossed on top. The slogan with the advert ran "Don't mistake familiarity for knowledge". Anyone looking at the advert would be sure the picture was the Mona Lisa, but despite this familiarity with the image, it was difficult to say which was the correct one. It appears, then, that we can represent the identity of an image in memory independently of its handedness. This goes to the heart of one of the central questions of computational theories of object recognition: does the representation of an object depend on the viewpoint from which it is seen, or is there a stage of processing at which the orientation or handedness of the object is irrelevant? And if object representation can be independent of viewpoint, how does the visual system discriminate enantiomorphs -lateral mirror images -such as those shown in Figure 2a ?
Enantiomorphs present a special case of image discrimination, because we have to discriminate between them only under special conditions -for example, while learning to read, when the difference between d and b is important, or in mathematics, when < and> have different meanings. However, these special cases, which have been overlearned through years of schooling, have not revealed how the brain registers the handedness of an image in those cases where reversing the handedness does alter the image's identity -for example, the piano in Figure 2a is still a piano in a way that b is not d. In the past hundred years or so, human neuropsychology has unearthed many specific and surprising deficits caused by brain damage. Damage to different regions of the visual system can lead to perceptual difficulties restricted, for example, to motion or colour or faces. In a recent paper, Turnbull and McCarthy [1] add to this list of deficits a case of enantiomorphic blindness -a patient who cannot tell the difference between two mirror images (see Fig. 2 ).
Turnbull and McCarthy [1] studied a patient, RJ, who had bilateral damage to the parietal lobes and was unable to say which of the three images in Figure 2a is the odd one out. He was, however, perfectly able to identify pictures and objects, could read and could detect the odd one out from Figures 2b and 2c. Note that the discrimination in Figure 2c is more difficult than the enantiomorphy discrimination failed by RJ. He was also sensitive to the orientation of words, distinguishing HOT from TOH, LEFT from TFEL, and RIGHT from . His deficit was therefore specific to lateral mirror images of objects. In a previous paper [2] , the same authors described another patient, LJ, who had an impairment specific to the canonical orientation of objects. This patient could recognize and name objects, but if presented with a rotated version of a R I G H T
Figure 1
The Mona Lisa -but is she facing the right way?
picture (as in Fig. 2b , bottom), she was unable to rotate it to its correct orientation.
At first sight, these findings might seem to support theories of object recognition that invoke viewpointindependent representations of objects in the brain [3, 4] . As Turnbull and McCarthy [1] point out, however, RJ's ability to discriminate large rotation differences (Fig. 2b) is not consistent with access to a viewpoint-independent representation in the absence of viewpoint-dependent information. If RJ had access only to viewpoint-independent representations then he should have been as blind to orientation differences as he was to mirror-reflections. This was not the case, however, and RJ was able to discriminate orientation differences such as that illustrated in Figure 2b . Turnbull and McCarthy [1] argue that RJ's failure to discriminate enantiomorphs was due to an inability to compare stored representations of objects with an egocentric frame of reference -that is, with respect to his own body.
Some evidence from animal studies can be interpreted as supporting Turnbull and McCarthy's hypothesis. Monkeys with parietal cortex lesions cannot discriminate mirror images [5] , and they are unimpaired on tests of egocentric spatial representation [6] [7] [8] . In other words, an enantiomorph-blind monkey can tell its own left from right, but not whether an object faces left or right. But this does not constitute evidence that any comparison is made between the object representation and one's own left or right. Furthermore, it also does not explain RJ's ability to discriminate the stimuli in Figure 2b . The parietal cortex has long been implicated in body-centred spatial processing, but there are other kinds of spatial computation performed by the parietal cortex that may also be interesting in the context of solving mirror-image discriminations.
The pattern of impairments in these patients and lesioned monkeys suggests that the parietal visual areas form an important part of the object processing system. This is something to which lip-service has been paid for many years, but studies of the physiology of higher level vision still tend to concentrate on inferior temporal cortex. There are old and deep foundations on which to build a theory of how parietal cortex contributes to the analysis of visually presented objects [5, 9] . Indeed, visual representation in the temporal lobe is of limited use without intact parietal cortex, which mediates the visuomotor transformations that allow one to interact with objects [10] .
Mirror images have a special status in the visual world. Infants of 3-4 months are able to discriminate between different orientations -such as versus -but not enantiomorphs -such as versus [11] . Older children, between the ages of 4 and 9 years, also find it more difficult to learn to discriminate lateral mirror images than any spatial transformations [12] . Other species -for example, fish, octopus, rodents and monkeys -are also easily confused by mirror images [13] . It is, of course, difficult to think of many ways in which one could confuse adult subjects with mirror images, and this is usually investigated using mental rotation tasks in which subjects are asked to state whether two views of an object are reflected (as in Fig. 2a ) or rotated (as in Fig. 2b ). These studies have led to the suggestion that, under some conditions, rotation through 180 degrees (Fig. 2b) and reflection (Fig. 2a) may involve some similar aspects of visual processing [14] . Here ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ 1080 Current Biology 1996, Vol 6 No 9 Figure 2 (a) An enantiomorph discrimination. These three objects are identical but for the fact that one is a lateral mirror reflection of the others. RJ was unable to make this kind of discrimination. (b) Vertical discrimination. These three objects are identical but for the fact that one is a vertical reflection of the others. RJ was able to make this kind of discrimination. (c) Feature discrimination. The odd one out differs in a subtle way. RJ was able to make this kind of discrimination.
again, however, the dissociation between RJ's ability to detect rotation or reflection differences suggests we may need to think again.
How does this special nature of reflected objects arise? If one thinks within a framework of view-dependent versus view-independent processes, then handedness-free representations in memory may appear as an achievement of the visual system (two views of an object being encoded as one). An alternative view is that handedness-free representations are not so much an achievement of the visual system as the inevitable result of the importance of symmetry in the real world -wherever mirror images occur, they are likely to do so because they form two halves of the same object. In this vein, Gross and Bornstein [13] argue that "the confusion of mirror images is not a 'confusion' but an adaptive mode of processing visual information. In the natural world, the only mirror images that ever occur are aspects of the same thing and therefore need not be distinguished. Rather, it is adaptive to treat enantiomorphs as equivalent to each other. Rather than the confusion of mirror images we can speak of their perceptual equivalence". One may even go further and speak of their 'behavioural equivalence': the direction in which one is looking may matter to social animals, but to most species, social or not, the direction in which something is facing may only have meaning when it is accompanied by movement. It would be interesting to know, therefore, whether patients with RJ's deficits have normal motion perception and can make direction discriminations based on motion.
Here, then, we have a framework for understanding the deficits shown by RJ. The visual system begins life unable to distinguish lateral mirror images. As occasion arises to do so, the visual system needs to generate a strategy with which to manipulate and compare lateral mirror images, for example in reading and mathematics, where differences between d and b, < and >, and Z and N are important. The ability to carry out spatial computations on visual images is probably dependent on parietal cortex. We need not postulate something akin to a 'mirror-image module', but it seems reasonable to propose that the normal mechanisms in parietal cortex can be used to contribute to very complex visual object processing.
One might wonder how RJ's ability to discriminate mirror reversed letters and words was unimpaired, but Turnbull and McCarthy [2] account for this, quite reasonably, by suggesting that, over time, mirror-image letters acquire the status of separate objects -that b and d, for example, become encoded as objects in their own right. Of course, it would not make sense to do the same for different views of our acquaintances. If Turnbull and McCarthy's account were correct, then the types of process required in enantiomorph discrimination should be localized to the parietal cortex. This is precisely what has been observed directly in a recent study [15] of human subjects performing mental rotation tasks in which they were asked to compare objects from different viewpoints and decide whether they were identical or enantiomorphs. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, increases in focal blood flow were observed the during mental rotation in cortical areas 7a and 7b, the regions one would expect to be concerned with this process. Similar observations were made earlier using event-related potential recordings [16] .
The rarity of occasions on which we have to discriminate enantiomorphs may make one wonder about their significance -after all, it is not every day that one is troubled by being required to remember the orientation of a painting. Nevertheless, studies of how the brain handles mirror images promise to provide significant insights into the way that discrete functional modules are organized in the visual cortex and, in particular, the contribution of the parietal cortex to object recognition.
